Ho aperto una nuova sezione del blog nella quale riporterò l’andamento del mio secondo progetto ovvero la mia personalissima scalata ad una delle migliori aziende al mondo : Berkshire Hataway.
E’ inutile nascondervi che sono ossessionato in maniera positiva da Warren Buffett,dai suoi scritti e la sua filosofia di vita e di investimento.
Penso di essere incredibilmente fortunato… ho la possibilità di acquistare a mio piacimento quote della sua meravigliosa azienda partecipando così all’incredibile processo di veder entrare tutti i mesi montagne di di dollari e vederli reinvestiti in nuovi splendidi business.
Accumulare oggi azioni Berkshire,nonostante il titolo non sia poi lontanissimo dai massimi storici,può comunque avere senso.
Alla quotazione odierna di 192000 dollari significa acquistare un’azienda che vale circa 1.28 il proprio patrimonio netto.
Per Warren Buffett il dato più importante in assoluto per valutare l’investimento in un bene,asset o azienda è sicuramente il valore intrinseco.
Questo dato non è però immediatamente e facilmente calcolabile da chiunque e può essere decisamente soggettivo.
Ecco che in aiuto arriva il book value ,dato che WB considera altrettanto “strategico”:
In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market.” Today, our emphasis has shifted in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened.
Intrinsic Business Value Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn’t, we are overpaid at any price. We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value. This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That’s because the amount by which Berkshire’s intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.
Tornando al nostro rapporto attuale di 1.28 ecco un altro estratto dalle lettere di Buffett :
Charlie and I have mixed emotions when Berkshire shares sell well below intrinsic value. We like making money for continuing shareholders, and there is no surer way to do that than by buying an asset – our own stock – that we know to be worth at least x for less than that – for .9x, .8x or even lower. (As one of our directors says, it’s like shooting fish in a barrel, after the barrel has been drained and the fish have quit flopping.) Nevertheless, we don’t enjoy cashing out partners at a discount, even though our doing so may give the selling shareholders a slightly higher price than they would receive if our bid was absent. When we are buying, therefore, we want those exiting partners to be fully informed about the value of the assets they are selling. At our limit price of 110% of book value, repurchases clearly increase Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value. And the more and the cheaper we buy, the greater the gain for continuing shareholders. Therefore, if given the opportunity, we will likely repurchase stock aggressively at our price limit or lower. You should know, however, that we have no interest in supporting the stock and that our bids will fade in particularly weak markets. Nor will we buy shares if our cash-equivalent holdings are below $20 billion. At Berkshire, financial strength that is unquestionable takes precedence over all else.
In pratica Warren Buffett considera un grandissimo affare acquistare azioni Berkshire quando valgono 1.10 volte il book value. Questa soglia è stata poi innalzata a 1.20 ..un valore davvero vicinissimo alle attuali quotazioni.
Ma perchè secondo lui sono fortemente sottovalutate ?
Perchè conosce esattamente di cosa sta parlando,quello che c’è dentro in quel patrimonio.. e sopratutto quanto vale !!
Ecco un classico esempio di come in realtà sia sottovalutato il patrimonio di Berkshire..ecco la storia di Geico uno dei colossi assicurativi presenti nell’impero:
Now let me tell you a story that will help you understand how the intrinsic value of a business can far exceed its book value. Relating this tale also gives me a chance to relive some great memories. Sixty years ago last month, GEICO entered my life, destined to shape it in a huge way. I was then a 20-year-old graduate student at Columbia, having elected to go there because my hero, Ben Graham, taught a once-a-week class at the school. 8 One day at the library, I checked out Ben’s entry in Who’s Who in America and found he was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co. (now called GEICO). I knew nothing of insurance and had never heard of the company. The librarian, however, steered me to a large compendium of insurers and, after reading the page on GEICO, I decided to visit the company. The following Saturday, I boarded an early train for Washington. Alas, when I arrived at the company’s headquarters, the building was closed. I then rather frantically started pounding on a door, until finally a janitor appeared. I asked him if there was anyone in the office I could talk to, and he steered me to the only person around, Lorimer Davidson. That was my lucky moment. During the next four hours, “Davy” gave me an education about both insurance and GEICO. It was the beginning of a wonderful friendship. Soon thereafter, I graduated from Columbia and became a stock salesman in Omaha. GEICO, of course, was my prime recommendation, which got me off to a great start with dozens of customers. GEICO also jump-started my net worth because, soon after meeting Davy, I made the stock 75% of my $9,800 investment portfolio. (Even so, I felt over-diversified.) Subsequently, Davy became CEO of GEICO, taking the company to undreamed-of heights before it got into trouble in the mid-1970s, a few years after his retirement. When that happened – with the stock falling by more than 95% – Berkshire bought about one-third of the company in the market, a position that over the years increased to 50% because of GEICO’s repurchases of its own shares. Berkshire’s cost for this half of the business was $46 million. (Despite the size of our position, we exercised no control over operations.) We then purchased the remaining 50% of GEICO at the beginning of 1996, which spurred Davy, at 95, to make a video tape saying how happy he was that his beloved GEICO would permanently reside with Berkshire. (He also playfully concluded with, “Next time, Warren, please make an appointment.”)
A lot has happened at GEICO during the last 60 years, but its core goal – saving Americans substantial money on their purchase of auto insurance – remains unchanged. (Try us at 1-800-847-7536 or http://www.GEICO.com.) In other words, get the policyholder’s business by deserving his business. Focusing on this objective, the company has grown to be America’s third-largest auto insurer, with a market share of 8.8%. When Tony Nicely, GEICO’s CEO, took over in 1993, that share was 2.0%, a level at which it had been stuck for more than a decade. GEICO became a different company under Tony, finding a path to consistent growth while simultaneously maintaining underwriting discipline and keeping its costs low. Let me quantify Tony’s achievement. When, in 1996, we bought the 50% of GEICO we didn’t already own, it cost us about $2.3 billion. That price implied a value of $4.6 billion for 100%. GEICO then had tangible net worth of $1.9 billion. The excess over tangible net worth of the implied value – $2.7 billion – was what we estimated GEICO’s “goodwill” to be worth at that time. That goodwill represented the economic value of the policyholders who were then doing business with GEICO. In 1995, those customers had paid the company $2.8 billion in premiums. Consequently, we were valuing GEICO’s customers at about 97% (2.7/2.8) of what they were annually paying the company. By industry standards, that was a very high price. But GEICO was no ordinary insurer: Because of the company’s low costs, its policyholders were consistently profitable and unusually loyal. Today, premium volume is $14.3 billion and growing. Yet we carry the goodwill of GEICO on our books at only $1.4 billion, an amount that will remain unchanged no matter how much the value of GEICO increases. (Under accounting rules, you write down the carrying value of goodwill if its economic value decreases, but leave it unchanged if economic value increases.) Using the 97%-of-premium-volume yardstick we applied to our 1996 purchase, the real value today of GEICO’s economic goodwill is about $14 billion. And this value is likely to be much higher ten and twenty years from now. GEICO – off to a strong start in 2011 – is the gift that keeps giving.
Ecco perchè più le quotazioni si avvicinano al book value e più il titolo diventa conveniente.. con un bel paracadute di un massiccio buy back in arrivo. . non male !
Io le azioni Berkshire le comprerei anche se leggermente sopravalutate ..figuratevi avere la fortuna di acquistarle sottovalutate.
Il patrimonio netto o book value cresce costantemente e negli ultimi 50 anni è aumentato del 19% composto..numeri incredibili.
Mentre le quotazioni oscillano ..l’intrinsic value e il book value aumentano riducendo il fatidico gap sempre di più.
Spiegare cosa c’è in Berkshire e cosa mi piace immensamente è impossibile in poche righe.. per il momento ho creato una pagina dove annoterò i miei investimenti e altri dati salienti.
Essendo risaputo che Berkshire Hataway non hai mai staccato una cedola gestirò questo investimento a parte..il lato oscuro in antitesi con le macchine da dividendo.. l’orlo della fondazione(per gli amanti di Asimov).
A presto !